The landing and the battle for Cassibile and Casanuova

The Acid North and Acid Center subsectors, between Cape Ognina and Cape Negro, target of the British 5th Infantry Division, were defended by four strongpoints manned by soldiers from the Italian 430th Coastal Battalion. From north-east to south-west, these strongpoints were: Santa Teresa Longarini, Torre Cuba, Fontane Bianche (“White Fountains”), and Foce del Cassibile (mouth of the Cassibile river). These strongpoints were covered by three artillery batteries belonging to the 27th 149/35 mm Artillery Group (Major Giuseppe Mineo), the 79th, 80th and 81st, located in their rear. The battery that most concerned the British was the 81st, the one in the highest position, located in the Cafici farm in the hamlet of Spingallo, north of Fontane Bianche.

This battery was one of the two objectives of the No. 3 Commando. At 3:00 in the night of 10 July, 180 British commandos from the No. 3 Commando, led by Lieutenant Colonel John Durnford-Slater, landed near Scoglio Imbiancato (“Whitened Rock”, between Cape Ognina and Fontane Bianche).

They silenced an Italian machine gun position, that had opened fire on them, and then they moved inland, running into a peasant who unwisely fired on them with his double-barreled shotgun and was promptly gunned down in response. They entered the Mortellaro valley, where they could see the 81st Battery firing against the beach; the commandos surrounded the battery and attacked hit with mortar and machine gun fire. Some of the defenders were killed or wounded, many others started to flee towards the 80th Battery (many of these were captured, some discarded their uniform and tried to go back to their homes or sought shelter among local families); in the end only one was left, 29-year-old Private Salvatore Occhipinti, a Sicilian from Ragusa. A small cheese vendor, Occhipinti had been conscripted in the Army in 1940; originally part of the small garrison of Santa Croce Camerina, he had been transferred to the 80th Battery – away from that village – as a punishment for his repeated unauthorized absences, as he often left his post to visit his wife and infant son in Santa Croce Camerina. Now that his battery was under enemy attack, while so many others were fleeing and urging him to do the same, this ‘absentee’ father-soldier remained at his post and stubbornly fought on with his machine gun, for patriotic pride, for fear, for a sudden surge of sense of duty, for reasons that only he knew. Salvatore Occhipinti fought till death; the British later buried his body in a shallow grave behind the farm. The same authorities that had punished him for his ‘excessive’ parental concern now awarded him a posthumous Bronze Medal for Military Valor.

Some ammunition reserves in the battery were hit and caught fire, at which point the commandos assaulted the battery with hand grenades, bayonets and submachine guns, capturing it. The fighting had lasted eighty-five minutes since the moment of the landing; the commandos had lost three men.

The 80th Battery, under Captain Giuseppe Di Lorenzo, was located more to the north-east, in the Platania farm, 4 km from Cassibile. This battery was attacked by about twenty British glider troops from the 1st Airlanding Brigade, led by Colonel Osmond Luxmoore Jones (deputy commander of the brigade). These troops had landed near the farm during the night, had remained hidden until daytime and then attacked the battery at dawn, capturing it at 11:15. Among the defenders, Sergeant Salvatore Duminuco (28 years old, a Sicilian from Sperlinga), whom had been mortally wounded while defending his gun, kept encouraging his men until he succumbed to his wounds; Private Stefano Palminteri (30 years old, also Sicilian, from Ribera) was posthumously awarded a Bronze Medal for Military Valor for his action during the defense of the battery. Lieutenant Luigi Pappalardo, from Palermo, deputy commander of the battery, was seriously wounded in the fight and later awarded a Silver Medal for Military Valor, and Second Lieutenant Ruggerini and artilleryman Sgarlata were also decorated for their spirited defense.

Not much is known about the fate of the 79th Battery, except that it was also taken out during the morning of July 10.

The 1st Squadron of the 2n SAS Regiment, meanwhile, had landed at the mouth of the Cassibile river, circumvented the strongpoint that was located there and captured the important and undamaged bridge on Highway 115, that led to Syracuse.

At the far left of the Italian defensive line, the S. Teresa Longarini stronghold was located, north of Cape Ognina; it was garrisoned by Captain Domenico Valle’s 3rd Company, which held out for the entirety of July 10 and part of July 11, until finally overrun by tanks. The strongpoint was initially assaulted by glider troops, who engaged a fierce battle in the attempt to free some of their men who had been captured by the Italians; the command of the 430th Coastal Battalion sent its cyclist platoon as a reinforcement. Lieutenant Giuseppe Ferrari (a 30-year-old Ligurian, from Genoa), in command of the cyclist platoon, fought his way towards Santa Teresa Longarini and once he got there he managed to stabilize the situation for some time, repelling the attacks for some hours. As several of his men had been killed or wounded and were thus unable to fight on, he armed the civilian workers who had been digging an anti-tank ditch near the strongpoint so that their rifles would not remain unused; he spurred his men to fight on until he was mortally wounded. The last to fall, Colonel Cancellara wrote in his report, was 20-year-old Sergeant Giovanni Cicchetti, an Abruzzese from Pereto, who “defended himself to his last breath, he was found by the military chaplain, don Silvagno, with his throat slit with his own bayonet, which he had used to fight on after running out of ammunition”.

Not very far from there, at a level crossing, 43-year-old Carabiniere Francesco Cascone, from Santa Croce Camerina, who had been sent on patrol in the area where the landings were taking place, engaged a solitary fight against the incoming British troops. He was shot repeatedly and badly wounded, but refused to surrender; he continued to fire back until he was killed by a burst of machine gun.

The Italian strongpoint at Cape Ognina, commanded by 30-year-old Lieutenant Giulio Tartarelli (another Ligurian, apparently like, curiously enogh, more than a few officers in this battalion where most of the rank and file were Sicilian), was quickly destroyed by superior forces of the 17th Infantry Brigade. Seven of the Italian defenders were killed by flamethrowers; Lieutenant Tartarelli, badly wounded and left alone with his orderly, was captured.

The Fontane Bianche beach was assaulted by two battalions from the 17th Brigade. The Italian strongpoint there was manned by 26 men, commanded by 32-year-old Sub-Lieutenant Delio Bertolini, a Tuscan from Apuania; they resisted for several hours, and were finally overrun after fourteen of them had been killed, including Bertolini, and most of the survivors were wounded.

The third echelon of the 3rd Army Commando, led by Major Peter Young, had been mistakenly landed in Fontane Bianche and started its march towards its designated objective, Torre Cuba, to the north-east. This consisted of a well-fortified strongpoint, located in a commanding position and defended by 53 men with four machine guns, one at each corner. This Italian garrison had already repelled an attack by two patrols from the 17th Infantry Brigade, that had also come there from Fontane Bianche, and captured some dispersed British glider soldiers. Major Young deployed his men and then assaulted the position with Bren guns and hand grenades, under fire from the Italian machine guns. Within fifteen minutes, Young’s commandos burst into the strongpoint and captured it; in the brief struggle eight Italians and one commando were wounded, as was a British glider soldier, prisoner of the Italians, who was hit by a stray shot. The commandos then proceeded towards Torre Ognina, where they demanded the surrender of the small Italian garrison of 17 men, who laid down their arms without resistance.

Major Federico’s 430th Coastal Battalion fought rather doggedly in Cassibile and Casanuova.

These two towns were attacked by three battalions of the British 17th Infantry Brigade: the 2nd Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers; the 2nd Battalion, Northamptonshire Regiment; and the 6th Battalion, Seafort Highlanders, that had overcome the resistance on the Fontane Bianche beach.

For a change, the Italian resistance is acknowledged even by the British side, in the memoirs of a Scot soldier who was there and was evidently uninformed, unlike some armchair historians, that the wops were supposed to have come out with their hands raised, eager to be taken out of the war. Then-sergeant James (Jim) Stockman, of the 6th Seaforth Highlanders, later recalled the battle for Cassibile in his book “Seaforth Highlanders 1939-1945: A Fighting Soldier Remembers”. In his memoir book, Stockman recalled that immediately after the landing his battalion had headed towards Casanuova, east of Cassibile, where it was met with strong Italian resistance. The Seaforth Highlanders managed to break this resistance with the help of a company from the 2nd Northampton, which carried out a converging manoeuvre in order to cover the Seaforth’s attack. Once they had stabilized the bridgehead and overcome a number of clashes with Italian infantry and artillery, the three battalions readied themselves for the assault, that would be carried out with the light of the day. Stockman considered it unlucky that Cassibile and its adjacent crossroads were located within his battalion’s landing area, as both of them were tenaciously defended by an Italian machine gun company, supported by tanks, howitzers and high caliber guns, all of them directly pointed at the beaches; this initially caused considerable losses, while they (the Seaforth) were frustrated by the apparent absence of their own artillery. Not even the Navy could help them, as naval guns risked to hit them as well, besides the enemy. It took three bloody hours for the Seaforth Highlanders to take Cassibile and silence those guns, which costed the Scots 40 casualties, including three officers killed.

So far, Stockman’s memoirs.

Damocle Marcuccetti, a Ligurian from Rivarolo Ligure, was a 42-year-old Lieutenant called back from the reserve; his strongpoint was attacked by paratroopers and fought back till annihilation. His corpse was found still holding his machine gun, at the mouth of the Cassibile river; sprawled around him were the lifeless bodies of seven of his men.

Corporal Bruno Agosti, a 29 year-old Venetian corporal from Caprino Veronese, was killed in action along with another six men while stubbornly defending the Cassibile roadblock against superior forces; many others were wounded, several of them seriously.

By 10:00 British troops had captured Cassibile and a considerable part of the state highway, as far as a few kilometres south of Syracuse. At 10:08 Admiral Troubridge was able to tell Montgomery that all the beaches had been captured and that enemy fire had ceased, save for some small pockets of resistance. The 151st Brigade was advancing towards Noto, the 17th towards Syracyse, whereas the 15th garrisoned the bridgehead. The 13th Brigade would be landed in the afternoon, with the task of taking Floridia.

Despite the fact that after the war the new Italian government recommended, for political reasons (as if the soldiers could be faulted for obeying their commands and government, which at the time, and until September 8, 1943, were still at war with the Allies), “special parsimony” in awarding decorations for actions that had taken place during the Sicilian campaign, a total of six Silver Medals and six Bronze Medals for Military Valor were awarded to men of the 430th Coastal Battalion; all but two of them were posthumous.

(Main source: Domenico Anfora, “La battaglia degli Iblei”)

The fall of Modica and the end of the 206th Coastal Division

Italian POWs from the 206th Coastal Division, July 1943.

By the evening of July 10, the 206th Coastal Division found itself in dire straits. General Achille D’Havet was unable to restore contact with the command of the XVI Corps; he had no news from the left sector (where the 146th Coastal Regiment, after suffering heavy casualties in Avola and Noto, was retreating towards Palazzolo); in the central sector, the front had fallen back to the Bonivini-Ispica line; in the coastal positions, the only remaining units were the 375th Battalion in Pozzallo and the 381st Battalion in Cava d’Aliga, both of them already engaged and outflanked by the Allies. The only working phone line was the one with the command of the 123rd Coastal Infantry Regiment, in Scicli; Santa Croce Camerina had been captured by the Americans, and incorrect news had spread about Ragusa, Giarratana and Monterosso having also been taken by the enemy (they hadn’t, although they would also fall soon), which would mean that enemy troops were already behind the command of the 206th Coastal Division. Major Liberti, having returned from the Corps command in Piazza Armerina, brought the bad news that there were no reinforcements available and that the 206th had to fend for itself.

Meanwhile, the battered remnants of the 146th Coastal Regiment, about 600 men led by Colonel Felice Bartimmo Cancellara, were retreating towards Vizzini, plagued by repeated Allied air strikes.

In the central sector, Mobile Group "F" under Major Argenziano, greatly weakened by the losses it had suffered, was still resisting in the Bonivini-Modica stronghold, a little to the south-east of Rosolini. This position was attacked by two companies of the 5th Battalion, Cameron Highlanders (152nd Infantry Brigade), supported by a machine gun company and by some Sherman tanks. An initial attack by tanks, that started at 1:30 on 11 July, was halted by an Italian 100/22 mm battery. At dawn the British attack resumed, until 5:50, with tanks now covered by smokescreens. Major Argenziano ordered all his gun to open fire and, simultaneously, sent a motorcyclist to Modica with a report. He never heard from him again, nor was he able to learn whether the report had reached its destination or not. The Italian artillery continued its fire until 10:00, when the British tanks ("C" Squadron, 50th Royal Tank Regiment) began an outflanking manoeuvre on the left, came very close and attempted to cut the road to Rosolini. Many Italian guns were hit and disabled by tank fire. At that point Argenziano, in order to avoid having his escape route cut off, ordered to disabile the surviving guns, then had his men board the trucks and retreated to Rosolini. But this town was also going to fall to the British very soon, as Console (Blackshirt rank equivalent to Colonel) Busalacchi’s Tactical Group "Sud" (South), under heavy pressure from Canadian troops, had retreated to Ispica, and was marching along the road to Frigintini with the intent of bringing his unit to Giarratana. Before the Canadian armoured vanguards could surround Rosolini, Major Argenziano took an internal road towards Modica, where he placed his group at General D’Havet’s disposal. D’Havet ordered Argenziano to deploy his men in the area of the Modica-La Sorda crossroads.

Late in the morning on July 11, Console Busalacchi also presented himself to D’Havet, who ordered him to go back with his group – seven 100 mm guns and 1,200 men – and to garrison the line that connected Roadblock 454, La Sorda (a district of Modica) and Villa Caterina (already garrisoned by three companies from the Engineers, the artillery and the headquarters). Busalacchi and his men went back but ran into a British column coming from the Rosolini-Frigintini road, that was repelled by fire from the seven guns. Then, while on the road, they were bombed and strafed by Allied aircraft. Finally, between 21:00 and 24:00 Busalacchi’s troops, exhausted from the long march and the fights they had sustained along the path, reached Modica.

Ragusa had been occupied by the 157th American Regiment in the early hours of July 12; Canadian armored columns were roaming along the roads north of Modica, towards Giarratana and Frigintini; to the east, Rosolini had been occupied and the command of the 122nd Coastal Regiment had been captured; to the south-east, Pozzallo had fallen.

Along the coast, the only territory that remained in Italian control was Scicli, where the command of the 123rd Coastal Regiment had its headquarters, with some units from the 381st Coastal Battalion, whereas two companies from the 542nd Bersaglieri Battalion were holding the line on the Irminio river. Modica was encircled, the end for the 206th Coastal Division was just a matter of time.

The Canadian assault on Modica began at dawn on July 12. The "Loyal Edmonton" Infantry Regiment, supported by a tank unit from the 12th "The Three Rivers" Armoured Regiment, concentrated its attack on La Sorda, where it was met with resolute opposition from Captain Casertano’s 3rd Sapper Company, Captain Amato’s mortar company and by the guns of the 1st Battalion, 54th 100/17 mm Artillery Group under Lieutenant Colonel Polcari. The leading tank and several jeeps were destroyed or disabled, and the tank officer who led the Canadian vanguard was killed.

General Achille D'Havet, commander of the 206th Coastal Division (from www.generals.dk)

At 6:00 Console Busalacchi reached General D’Havet and reported that his line was very weak, as little more than 500 men – 218 Blackshirts and about 300 between mortar-men and artillerymen – were left from the initial 1,200 that he had brought to Modica. D’Havet ordered him to resist on the spot.

At 7:30 a Carabiniere arrived from Ragusa, riding a donkey and disguised as a peasant, bringing a message from prefect Moroni, who asked to free Ragusa of the American tank troops that had remained there as a garrison, as most of the Allied forces had carried on towards Giarratana and Vizzini. The prefect did not understand, evidently, how desperate was by now the situation of the 206th Coastal Division.

At 8:30 D’Havet went to the town center, where he ordered the removal of the white sheets that had already been hung from the balconies by the civilians, and he went to speak with the local authorities. Finally, he decided to go to La Sorda to personally ascertain the situation, but Allied tanks coming from Ispica were already in the outskirts of Modica, so he decided to go back to his headquarters, where he found out that the phone lines were no longer working.

At about 10:00 Allied artillery started to shell La Sorda in order to overcome the resistance by its defenders, while Canadian infantry started to enter the town. A Canadian negotiator went to meet D’Havet and relayed to him that the Canadian divisional commander, General Guy Simonds, demanded that he ordered the end of the resistance in La Sorda, otherwise naval artillery would destroy Modica. Moreover, Simonds waited D’Havet so that the surrender of his troops could be arranged. D’Havet did not go personally, but sent instead his chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Lombardi, who while on his way to the Canadian headquarters informed the commanders of the units who were still resisting that it was all over.

Console Busalacchi ordered his men to destroy their weapons, then went to D’Havet, asking him the authorization to go into hiding and escape capture. D’Havet authorized him, and Busalacchi left Modica on a motorcycle, taking the road to Scicli, with the aim of reaching the Irminio front and from there the command of the 54th Infantry Division "Napoli", that was still resisting. Along the way, however, he was stopped and captured by an American patrol: Scicli had fallen as well.

Colonel Giuseppe Primaverile standing among the men of the 123rd Coastal Infantry Regiment (Giuseppe Primaverile Collection - from "La battaglia degli Iblei", Domenico Anfora)

Scicli had been garrisoned by the 123rd Coastal Infantry Regiment (also part of the 206th Coastal Division), under the command of Colonel Giuseppe Primaverile. During the night before the landings, the 123rd had been involved in a lot of sparse fighting against American paratroopers that had mistakenly landed in his sector, a hundred of whom had been captured; the coastal batteries manned by the 123rd Regiment had opposed the landing in Scoglitti, and its infantry units had clashed with the advancing Americans in Santa Croce Camerina and elsewhere, but had been defeated. By the morning of July 12, the 123rd was surrounded: to its left, the 381st Coastal Battalion had retreated from the beaches of Cava d’Aliga to the stronghold located at kilometre 8 of the Pozzallo-Sampieri road, defending the eastern flank of the regiment; to its right, on the Irminio river, the two Bersaglieri companies were under attack by American troops; to the north, Modica had been captured by the Canadians. Units of the Edmonton Regiment (2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade), supported by a troop of Sherman tanks and by American paratroopers, had marched towards Scicli, and at 11:00 in the morning of July 12 an American negotiator had presented himself to Colonel Primaverile, demanding his surrender. Primaverile had capitulated.

In La Sorda, Major Argenziano, when a private told him that the divisional chief of staff had ordered to surrender, and having ascertained that every road was blocked by the Canadian troops, at 11:30 retreated towards the town center, but was captured by a tank unit shortly afterwards. Along with the mayor, Emanuele Giardina, and with General D’Havet, Argenziano was taken to the headquarters of the 1st Canadian Division, where General Simonds was waiting for them. Achille D’Havet was the first Axis general to be captured in Sicily; General Oliver Leese, the commander of the British XXX Corps, wanted to celebrate this first and had him as a dinner guest. On the following day, D’Havet was embarked on a ship bound for Algeria, where he was interned in a POW Camp; he would be repatriated in December 1944, during Italy’s co-belligerence with the Allies.

General D'Havet, right, leaves after his surrender ceremony (Canadian Army Newsreel)

Overall, 1,100 Italian troops were taken prisoner in Modica. The 206th Coastal Division had effectively ceased to exist, with the exception of Colonel Cancellara’s 146th Coastal Infantry Regiment, whose battered remnants, after fighting in Avola and Noto, withdrew to Vizzini and fought on, during the following days, alongside the Germans.

The extent of the casualties suffered by the 206th Coastal Division is not precisely known; in the report he wrote after his release, General D’Havet estimated that between 35 and 40 officers and between 500 and 700 non-commissioned officers and soldiers had been killed, from a force of some 8,500 men. No information about the number of the wounded and prisoners; the former was probably quite high, if one considers that the 146th Coastal Regiment alone suffered some 400 wounded (plus about a hundred killed) in the first two days of fighting. The latter likely numbered in the thousands, comprising the vast majority of the men in the 206th Coastal Division.

The Canadian official history, sistematically dismissive of any Italian resistance, described the capture of Modica and the surrender of the 206th Coastal Division in the following terms: “Unlike the hill town Ispica, Modica lies in a deep gully, and from their position of vantage on the surrounding heights it appeared unlikely to the Patricias that the reduction of the place would present much difficulty. Late on the 11th the naval F.O.O., Captain Mitchell, after his exploit with the road-block had reached the outskirts of the town to find it occupied by Italians only. His report that there were no Germans in the Modica area was relayed by the 2nd Brigade to Divisional Headquarters shortly after midnight, and was followed by another message that. Modica was seeking to surrender. An immediate reply, dispatched at 1:25 a.m., ordered the Patricias to accept the town's submission. Accordingly, on the morning of the 12th, after a 15-minute bombardment by the 142nd Field Regiment, a fighting patrol from the battalion went down into the town and took a considerable number of prisoners. Reports appearing in the official war diaries and accounts given later by participants are at some variance as to what followed. It appears that Modica was left without any occupying forces, and that some enemy elements who showed more spirit than usual had either re-entered the town or ,emerged from the cellars to which the artillery bombardment had driven them. About mid-morning two small detachments, one consisting of two Seaforth lorries, bringing forward rations and ammunition, and one from the R.C.R.'s anti-tank platoon, both seeking their respective units, entered Modica under the impression that it was safely in Canadian hands. As the former approached the central square, however, it was ambushed; it suffered some casualties and lost one of its vehicles. The R.C.R. and Seaforth parties, joining forces, advanced under cover of fire from a mortar whose crew had become attached to the anti-tank group. Not until further artillery fire had been called down from the Royal Devon Yeomanry did resistance cease and the little band of fifteen reach the main piazza. There they captured seven field and five medium guns and one anti-tank gun, which were sited to cover all converging roads. From all parts of the town several hundred Italian soldiers now came flocking to surrender. They were turned over to The Edmonton Regiment-the fourth infantry battalion to claim a share in the occupation of Modica. A possible reason for the brief flare-up of resistance was the presence in Modica of the headquarters of the 206th Italian Coastal Division, the formation, it will be recalled, responsible for the defence of the coastline between Licata and Augusta. The Commander, Major-General Achille d'Havet, who had been decorated by the Duke of Connaught with the Military Cross in the First World War, was concerned that his capitulation should be made to an officer of appropriate rank--a sensitiveness which caused the General rather a frustrating morning, and produced a number of separate claims for credit for his initial capture. From the mass of conflicting evidence it would appear that the first Canadian to make contact with the Italian commander was a sergeant of the P.P.C.L.I. fighting patrol, who discovered d'Havet in a building in Modica. The General's request for a captor of more exalted rank was referred to the 2nd Brigade Headquarters-apparently on more than one occasion and by more than one agency. Eventually he formally placed himself in the hands of the Brigade Major, Major R.S. Malone, who conducted him to General Simonds' Headquarters. Here the G.O.C. had the pleasure of accepting the submission of the first general officer to be captured by Canadian troops in the Second World War”.

Some personal accounts are even more scathing, as individual Canadian soldiers who entered Modica in the confusion that followed the surrender agreement between D’Havet and Simonds, appear to have taken the situation as if the hundreds of Italian soldiers garrisoning the town (whom had already been ordered to lay down their arms) were rushing to spontaneously surrender to them. Mark Zuehlke, in his book “Through Blood and Sweat: A Remembrance Trek Across Sicily's World War II Battlegrounds”, is one such example, as he describes how a Canadian Lieutenant “was responsible for taking virtually an entire division [the 206th] bloodlessly out of the war”, while in reality hundreds of soldiers from the 206th Coastal Division lay dead between Avola, Noto, Modica, Cassibile, Casanuova, the surroundings of Augusta and elsewhere in the Sicilian countryside, killed in a hopeless struggle against far more numerous and well-armed enemies. Zuehlke even twists the knife by adding, “I point out that it is a very good thing that the Italians had scant interest in fighting. All these stone walls could have been transformed into fortified bastions of resistance. A single machine gun firing through a loophole in one wall could have held up a battalion for hours, and killed a lot of soldiers”. Apparently, tanks, artillery and aircraft, which the Canadians had in abudance and the Italians were nearly deprived of, do not factor in these considerations. Any resistance from “those stone walls”, a resistance that actually took place in several instances, was easily blasted into oblivion by the superior Allied weaponry.

Zuehlke also repeats the never-ending refrain, started by Allied propaganda and kept on after the war by the Anglo-Saxon’s innate sense of superiority towards Italians, of the Italian – more precisely, in this case, Sicilian – soldiers who had decided, to a man, that they would not “die for Rome” or “for Mussolini” (“for Italy” is a notion that seems not to exist): after all, as everybody knows in the lands where English is spoken, loyalty to the country and sense of duty – misplaced or not – only exist among the Germans and Anglo-Saxons, whereas Latins and especially Italians can only be interested in going home to drink wine, eat spaghetti and be with their mothers. Don’t they?

In reality, whereas a substantial part of the ill-armed, disillusioned Sicilian soldiers did give up rather quickly as soon as they realized the hopelessness of their situation, many others stayed and fought back, and lost their lives, including more than some of the haggard territorials of the miserabile 206th Coastal Division. Historian Enrico Cernuschi has noted how the registers of the Commonwealth War Graves Commission list 489 British and Canadian soldiers as killed in action between 10 and 12 July 1943 in the sector held by the 206th Coastal Division, and buried in the Agira and Syracuse war cemeteries – a number that does not include the Allied airborne troops that fell into the sea with their gliders in the partially botched Operation Ladbroke, as their bodies were, for the most part, never found and they are thus considered as missing in action. Furthermore, the Royal Navy lost twelve landing craft off that part of the Sicilian coast. Not a single German soldier appeared in this area during those two days.

But the Canadian propaganda newsreels in the first days of the invasion were anxious to let the public know that “Italian prisoners were coming back in the hundreds, anxious to get out of the war as quickly as possible”…

The end - Italian prisoners are marched through Syracuse in July 1943. Some happy, some sullen...

Report about the events that involved the 207th Coastal Division on 10 July 1943 and the "Schreiber" Tactical Group from 11 July to 21 July 1943

Report about the events that involved the 207th Coastal Division on 10 July 1943 and the "Schreiber" Tactical Group from 11 July to 21 July 1943

4 August 1943 – From the Command of the "Assietta" Infantry Division to the Command of the XII Corps

As ordered by the Command of the XII Corps, on the morning of 9 July all the units of the 207th Coastal Division were put in a state of alert (without involving the population). More messages followed about strenghtening the surveillance and allow the units in better condition to timely face a possible enemy landing attempt; an attempt that the Anglo-American propaganda and the information that had been gathered made [us] presume to be imminent.

At 19:00 the Command of the XII Corps radioed that a convoy of transport ships, heavily escorted, was sailing from the Algerian and Tunisian ports with course north, north-east. Another convoy, composed of about 300 ships between transport ships and landing craft, heavily escorted by warships, was reported near Malta. Immediately afterwards, news was received that said convoy was sailing with part of its ships towards the north-east; the other ships towards the north-west.

At 01:00 on 10 July the Command of the XII Corps ordered to put the state of emergency into effect. The modalities were those previously decided and mentioned in the No. 1 Ordinance of the Armed Forces Command of Sicily (H. E. Roatta). These measures are immediately implemented.

Shortly thereafter the deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces Command (Colonel Bogliaccino) ordered by telephone to quickly blow up and thus destroy the harbours of Licata and Porto Empedocle. Orders were issued accordingly.

During the night the divisional command was moved to the stronghold of Rupe Atenea (command post – observatory).

At 4:00 the Licata Sector Command reported that said port had been rendered unusable in accordance with the plans for its destruction with explosives. A similar message arrived around 4:30 from the Porto Empedocle Sector Command about making unserviceable the central pier of that harbour.

All of the above was reported to the Command of the XII Corps, which immediately thereafter ordered to start the work for the destruction of the western and eastern piers of the harbour of Porto Empedocle. The commander of the 109th Sapper Company, tasked with carrying out this order, returns to the scene with the necessary personnel and material. At about 10:00 the Porto Empedocle Sector Command reports that the two above-mentioned piers have been destroyed.

News come from the Licata sector command about the approach of numerous enemy landing craft near Licata harbour, Torre di Gaffe and Regione Fontanazza. Transport ships and warships are also reported as sailing towards the port of Licata. As soon as the landing craft come within effective range, the reaction by the artillery units deployed near the coast begins, timely and heavy. Many craft are destroyed. The surviving ones come closer and, supported by their air force and the naval artillery that are incessantly pounding our positions, they manage to reach the beach allowing the landing of troops, vehicles and tanks. Local fighting breaks out and continues for some hours in the areas where the enemy has managed to land. The enemy air force, which has the control of the air, hampers the influx of reinforcements and reserves, that suffer heavy losses as a consequence of the continuous bombing and strafing actions. Enemy motorized and armoured forces invade the Licata plain, heading for the S. Oliva station and towards C. Sillitti Alta. The Licata sector command assembles all the units at its disposal in the area of S. Oliva station and sends them to the counterattack, but is unable to repel the enemy, due to the prevalence of the enemy forces.

Another counterattack could have been carried out by the tactical group commanded by Console [Blackshirt rank equivalent to Colonel] Negroni – composed of the 17th Blackshirt Battalion and the 1st "Cavalleggeri di Palermo" Cavalry Squadron Group [cavalry unit equivalent to battalion] – which since five in the morning had been ordered to move from the Catena and Ravanusa area to the S. Oliva area. But this group, for unknown reasons, never arrived on the scene. It instead appears that, by order of the above-mentioned Console Negroni, at some point the group retreated through Ravanusa and towards Caltanissetta. Both this decision and the chosen path of retreat appear to be very strange; if the withdrawal had been decided, this should have been executed towards Canicattì, where those units, in co-operation with other units, could have taken part in more operations.

Once the coastal units in the Licata sector, overwhelmed by the prevalent enemy forces, had ceaed their resistance, the enemy action gradually moved towards Campobello di Licata, with some smaller units heading towards Palma di Montechiaro (passing through C. Sillitti Alta). A platoon of the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company, sent from Agrigento beyond Palma di Montechiaro, manages – not without difficulty – to occupy a position a little to the east of this town, but shortly afterwards is forced to retreat to the west of the town.

The threat against Campobello di Licata remains serious; in order to face it, the Command of the XII Corps allocates to me, at my request, the 162nd Self-Propelled 90/53 mm Anti-Tank Gun Group, stationed in Canicattì, and the 526th Bersaglieri Battalion, stationed in Aragona. As the above-mentioned gun group immediately starts to move towards the ordered position, I attach to it the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company, except for a platoon, in order to ensure the close defense of the guns.

The above-mentioned group is deployed near Favarotta, blockading the road from Licata. The 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company is deployed in front of the guns, in order to provide defense to them. The 526th Bersaglieri Battalion, carried by motor vehicles, only reaches the above-mentioned area during the night. Colonel Venturi, in command of the 177th Bersaglieri Regiment, takes command of the tactical group (the above-mentioned battalion, the 162nd SPG Group, the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company).

I am subsequently allocated the following units:

–        the 527th Bersaglieri Battalion, stationed in Favara

–        a 105/28 mm artillery group,

–        the 35th Bersaglieri Battalion of the 10th Regiment (motorized),

–        a 75/27 mm battery.

The Command of the XII Corps order the following manoeuvres to be carried out at dawn on day 11:

a) Counterattack from the Favarotta area in the direction of S. Oliva – Licata. Forces allocated: Command of the 177th Bersaglieri Regiment; 526th Bersaglieri Battalion; 162nd 90/53 Group; 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company (minus one platoon).

b) Counterattack from the Naro river in the direction of Palma di Montechiaro. Forces allocated: 35th Battalion of the 10th Bersaglieri Regiment; one 75/27 mm battery.

c) Counterattack from the position currently held west of Palma di Montechiaro in the direction of Palma di Montechiaro – Licata. Forces allocated: 527th Bersaglieri Battalion (from Favara, in the morning of July 10 it has been moved to Masseria Giudice, near Cozzo Mosè); a 105/28 mm battery; a platoon of the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company.

I am allocated another battalion of the 10th Bersaglieri Regiment, which is despatched, with motor vehicles, to the Agrigento area.

Day 11 (morning)

Campobello di Licata Sector

At dawn on day 11 the enemy, with considerable forces and significant numbers of motor vehicles, suddenly attacks in the Favarotta sector. Our reaction is prompt and vigorous. Armored cars and tanks are destroyed by the accurate fire from the 90/53 mm guns. The action goes on for several hours, heavily engaging [our] units. The enemy sends more units into the fight. Attacks and counterattacks follow one another for the occupation of Favarotta.

Some of the 90/53 mm guns are hit by enemy anti-tank fire and are disabled; the 526th Bersaglieri Battalion and the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company suffer heavy losses. During a counterattack, Colonel Venturi, the commander of the group, his wounded. He returns to his command post after hasty treatment.

The disparity in forces and means forces [our] withdrawal. This is carried out under the protection of the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company.

The units concentrate in the S. Silvestro area, about 4 km south of Canicattì. In order to reinforce the new formation, the Corps command allocates [to us] the 162nd Self-Propelled 90/53 Anti-Tank Gun Group.

Naro Sector

The counterattack from Naro towards Palma di Montechiaro, which should have taken place simultaneously with the counterattack towards S. Oliva – Licata from Campobello di Licata, has to be postponed to the afternoon, due to the delayed arrival of the 35th Motorized Bersaglieri Battalion and of its 75/27 mm battery. This battalion only arrives in Spinasanta (Agrigento) around 8:00 on 11 July. Sent towards the Naro river, it stops near Castrofilippo, where the commander arranges his men, material and vehicles in view of the imminent action. [The battalion] resumes its march with security measures around 11:00.

Palma di Montechiaro Sector

The action towards Palma di Montechiaro, aimed at the recapture of the town, is carried out by the 527th Bersaglieri Battalion, which has come from Masserie Giudice, and reinforced by a 105/28 mm battery and by a platoon from the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company. The Bersaglieri battalion and the battery have arrived west of Palma di Montechiaro in the night between 10 and 11 July. In the early hours of the morning, a company of the Bersaglieri battalion manages to recapture Palma di Montechiaro with a surprise action, driving the enemy outside of the town. The arrival of additional enemy forces, which heavily engage the above-mentioned company, lead the battalion commander to engage the other units inside the town and in the surrounding hills. Fierce fighting thus goes on with varying fortunes. In the end, the intervention of enemy tanks and armoured cars hastens the enemy victory. The battalion is surrounded and forced to surrender.

Day 11 (afternoon)

Around 10:35, by order of the Command of the XII Corps, I leave Agrigento in order to go to Canicattì to take command of a tactical group that includes:

–        a tactical group [commanded by] Colonel Venturi;

–        a German regiment (Colonel Geisler),

with the task of counterattacking towards Licata in order to thrown the enemy back into the sea.

I arrive in Canicattì around 11:30. A lot of time is needed to make contact with the German regimental commander. The Geisler regiment is composed of a battalion stationed in the Castrofilippo area as well as minor units.

The attack begins around 13:30; some units of the German regiment get to about two kilometres south of Campobello; but the enemy artillery fire and a counterattack supported by tanks force said units to retreat. Some tanks push west of Canicattì. It becomes clear that the enemy has already reached, on the hills south of Campobello, such a strength (heavy artillery deployment – armoured fighting vehicles) which would render more [counterattack] attempts with few forces and without tanks improductive. I thus decide to concentrate the units on the S. Silvestro position and to give up the counterattack for the moment.

Simultaneously with the action on Campobello, the attack on Naro (35th Bersaglieri Battalion) takes place, leading to the capture of the hills north of the town. The enemy, having arrived into the town, vainly tries to repel our units.

Besides the 105/28 battery which has been positioned since the morning near Serralunga, another 105/28 battery, which has recently arrived, i salso deployed south of Canicattì, its task including serving as an anti-tank battery.

The enemy re-establishes contact [with our units]. Around 18:00 an attack by tanks, followed by infanty, takes place. The attack resumes around 19:00 with greater intensity. Some tanks are about to enter the town; they are however stopped, and part of them destroyed, by some 90/53 mm guns that I had promptly deployed a little to the south-west of Canicattì. The remaining enemy tanks retreat to their starting positions.

Between 18:00 and 19:00 many enemy aircraft carry out a heavy bombing on Canicattì and especially on its train station. Even the enemy artillery fires on the town itself.

The Corps command reports that it has allocated [to us] the following units:ù

–        truck borne group of the "Assietta" Division, including the 3rd Battalion of the 30th Infantry Regiment and the 233rd 75/27 mm T.M. Artillery Group;

–        the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Infantry Regiment – truck borne,

–        the 28th "Aosta" Artillery Company – truck borne,

–        the 19th 105/28 mm "Centauro" Group.

Gathering area: Serradifalco.

With the forces already at my disposal and with those above mentioned, I am to resume the counterattack on the morning of the following day (12 July).

At about 20:00 Colonel Fullriede, commander of a German regiment of the 15th Division which is coming from Canicattì, presents himself and informs me that he has taken command of all German forces in the sector and that he is subordinated to me.

He also tells me that the Armed Forces Command Sicily has given order to take a defensive stance in the Canicattì sector, waiting for the arrival of new German forces with which the Sizilien Division (15h) would launch the counteroffensive.

The command of the XII Corps, which I phoned to receive orders, tells me that Colonel Fullriede’s information is not correct, and confirms that in the following morning (July 12) with all the Italian and German forces already in the area and with those that are soon going to arrive, I must resume the counterattack towards Licata in order to drive the enemy back into the sea.

Colonel Fullriede, to which I relate the orders that I received from the command of the XII Corps, declares that, in consideration of the available forces and the enemy situation, he rules out the possibility of participating in the action [with his forces]. He appears especially worried by the news gathered by the advanced patrols about the movements of strong enemy units west of Canicattì. Following a phone conversation that Colonel Fullriede had with the commander of the 15th German Division, he [Fullriede] tells me that he intends move, during the night, with his regiment just north of Canicattì in order to avoid the feared enemy outflanking manoeuvre on the right (west). He moreover informs me that this measure has been approved by the Armed Forces Command Sicily. He insists about the necessity not to lose time, due to the seriousness of the situation, that does not allow for any other solution. Colonel Fullriede himself then immediately proceeds to issue the orders for the withdrawal on the rearward line of the German troops.

In the meantime, the command of the XII Corps, altering what had been previously ordered, orders me to limit my activity to partial counterattack actions as long as these do not entail a waste of men and means but are justified by the necessity to mantain the positions. Basically, our stance is radically modified.

I order that the few Italian units deployed south of Canicattì also retreat towards the new positions located north of the town. The withdrawal is carried out not without difficulty. The 105/28 battery stationed in Serralunga (road to Naro), overpowere by the enemy, falls in enemy hands after disabling its guns.

Additionally, I order the 35th Bersaglieri Battalion, which would remain completely isolated in the Naro area, to retreat to Castrofilippo during the night.

Day 12

Following the movements that took place during the night, the troops under my command have assumed the deployment that can be seen in the no. 1 attached sketch. 

I want to learn whether the new units allocated to me and headed for Serradifalco have reached said town or not. An officer from my command is sent to Serradifalco. The 3rd Battalion of the 30th Infantry Regiment arrives in Serradifalco around 7:00. The personnel is gathered south of the town, in a sheltered area, waiting for orders for their subsequent employment. The motor vehicles are sent beyond the town along the road to San Cataldo, in order for them to avoid the enemy air action.

Lieutenant Colonel Spinelli, in command of the 3rd Battalion of the 30th Infantry Regiment, relates to me that, during the movement:

–        thirty Spa L 39 trucks have been set afire and destroyed by enemy air strikes; part of the material (weapons and ammunition) has been recovered;

–        the Sicilian soldiers have arbitrarily left (20 % of the total force);

–        the losses are limited to ten men slightly wounded.

Subsequently, the 233rd 75/27 mm T.M. Artillery Group arrives – It gathers near the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment. Later still, the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment and the commander of the 19th 105/28 "Centauro" Group arrive. Their respective units are stopped along the road that from Montedoro leads to Serradifalco. They inform me that during the movement, that due to contingent reasons was largely carried out during daytime, their units have been repeatedly attacked by waves of Anglo-American bombers, have therefore dispersed and part of the material has been destroyed. More specifically:

–        the 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment "Aosta" is down to 7 officers, 100 men between NCOs and soldiers – 3 submachine guns – 1 machine gun;

–        the 28th Gun Company "Aosta" is down to 3 officers – 54 between NCOs and soldiers – three 47/32 guns;

–        the 233rd 75/27 mm T.M. Group is down to six guns;

–        the 19th "Centauro" Group is down to four 105/28 guns and their tractors.

Motorcycle troops are sent along the path followed by the individual motorized columns in order to direct the stragglers towards Serradifalco. These are basically units with severely reduced efficency and doubtful operational capacities.

While we proceed to reorganize these units, the German regimental command informs that the enemy has attacked in force in the sector of the frontline held by the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The German troops are heavily engaged. The two 90/53 SPG groups, used in anti-tank function, also participate in the action, as well as a 105/28 battery. The battle resumes in the afternoon, fiercer than before. Despite the considerable losses suffered by the German units, the attack is contained.

The remnants of the 526th Bersaglieri Battalion also participate in the fighting.

At about 19:00 another attack in force causes the collapse of the 2nd German Battalion. This entails the withdrawal of the entire formation towards the Serradifalco – S. Cataldo position. The 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, reinforced by the 233rd Group, takes position south of Serradifalco, covering the withdrawal. The above-mentioned battalion is allocated a formation company, formed with all the available elements (about a hundred men) of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment. The final deployment assumed during the night by all troops under my command can be seen in the no. 2 attached sketch.

The command of the XII Corps allocates [to me] a radio station in order to mantain a connection, and a patrol of Carabinieri motorcyclists with the task of relaying any urgent operative news.

Day 13

I ask by radio the command of the XII Corps what is the situation on my right, and I am answered that Racalmuto is heavily garrisoned by our troops, which also included armored car units. German armored cars, sent on patrol to Montedoro and Racalmuto in order to make contact with the Italian troops, instead report that in Racalmuto there are only four Carabinieri.

At 10:00 the enemy, using patrols, regains contact with our new deployment. Local clashes arise in the sector held by the German battalions. In the afternoon enemy patrol activity intensifies, and is followed by an attack in force towards Serradifalco. After changing fortunes, the American withdraw to their starting positions. Italian artillery participated in this action with interdiction and counterbattery fire. 

The company of the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment previously deployed at the Sommatino crossroads comes back. This unit has suffered considerable losses as a result of aerial bombing and enemy attacks. Of the 75/27 mm section attached to said company, only one gun comes back (the other one has been destroyed by aerial bombing).

Day 14

During the night between July 13 and 14 the Fullriede regiment is reinforced by another two battalions (total five battalions) – two 150 mm guns – three bomb launchers with four 210 mm pieces – about fifteen tanks. The availability of larger forces allows to extend the front to the left as far as Caltanissetta, and to move the resistance line more to the south. The consequent movements are carried out in the night between 14 and 15 July. During the entire day, lively patrol actions between the opposed forces, as well as artillery action. Italian and German patrols are supported by tanks.

Day 15

From the no. 3 attached sketch it is possible to comprehend the new deployment that was assumed during the night.

Movements of armored cars and motor vehicles from Canicattì and from Delia towards our positions are reported. The artillery intervenes with interdiction fire.

The deployment of the units on the positions is completed, and strengthening work is carried out.

Day 16

Motor vehicles are reported on the move from Canicattì and from Delia. Local clashes take place on the frontline. The [enemy] air force bombs our positions. The situation, while basically stationary in our sector, deteriorates instead in Barrafranca and Pietraperzia where units subordinated to the 15th Division "Sizilien" (Ens Regiment), after bitter fighting and dogged resistance, are forced to withdraw in the face of the prevalent enemy attacking forces.

The retreat of those units, along with other events, induce the Armed Forces Command Sicily to order the retreat of the tactical group under my command.

The Fullriede Group, by orders from the command of the 15th Division "Sizilien", must go to Leonforte. Beginning of the movement: the night between July 16 and 17.

The Italian troops, by orders from the Command of the XII Corps, must reach the Portella Recattivo-Alimeno area and blockade the roads coming from S. Caterina di Villarmosa and from Villacapriolo. Beginning of the movement: the evening of July 17.

I order that the command of the 17th Blackshirt Legion, the 17th Blackshirt Battalion and the 1st Squadron Group "Cavalleggeri di Palermo" which, to my surprise, I found idle in Caltanissetta, are to be incorporated into my tactical group.

Orders are given to the people responsible for the clothing and army provisions depots, located near the S. Cataldo railway station, for the distribution of food and clothing to the population. The distribution, supervised by the S. Cataldo Carabinieri, begins on the same evening and continues during the night.

At 22:00 the movement begins.

The following units are sent towards Alimena:

–        Command of the 17th Blackshirt Legion;

–        17th Blackshirt Battalion;

–        28th Artillery Company "Aosta";

–        233rd 75/27 T.M. Artillery Group;

–        two 90/53 mm guns.

The following units are sent towards Portella Recattivo:

–        3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment (truck borne),

–        formation company of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment (truck borne),

–        19th 105/28 mm Group "Centauro",

–        1st Squadron Group "Cavalleggeri di Palermo",

–        1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company,

–        four 90/53 mm guns.

Colonel Perrone, in command of Mobile Group "A", presents himself and reports that he has reached, with the motorized armored group at his orders, the Villalba station.

Day 17

In the night between July 16 and 17 the movement towards the Alimena and Portella Recattivo positions generally carries on by the book.

The 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, having reached the crossroads to S. Caterina Villarmosa, is forced to follow another path as the road towards S. Caterina Villarmosa had been interrupted in multiple points by German sappers. This unforeseen difficulty forces the battalion to stop at dawn in the Resuttano area, then resuming the movement late in the evening.

The defense of the Portella [a small mountain pass] is initially entrusted to the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company, to the 90/53 mm guns and to the 19th "Centauro" Group. On the spot, verbal orders are given for the organization of the defense of Portella Recattivo (Lieutenant Colonel Spinelli) and Alimena (Console Negroni).

I later go to the Villalba station in order to make contact with Mobile Group "A" (Lieutenant Colonel Perrone). There I find that the above-mentioned group is gathered in a wood and that no measures have been taken for reconnaissance and security. I therefore order that the two roads leading to the town of Villalba are blockaded, and that patrols are sent south of said town.

Day 18

In the night between 17 and 18 July the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiments reaches the Portella Recattivo. The deployment of the units can be seen in the no. 4 attachment. 

On the same night, the 1st Squadron Group "Cavalleggeri di Palermo" and the 1st Motorized Machine Gun Company are transferred by me to Resuttano.

During the entire day, patrols sent by me south of Portella Recattivo report considerable movement of armored vehicles in the S. Caterina Villarmosa area, coming from Caltanissetta and heading towards Vallelunga. More motor vehicles are reported in movement towards Portella Recattivo. Our artillery intervenes. The vehicles heading towards the Portella fall back. At 7:00 the enemy artillery opens a heavy and accurate fire on our positions held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment and on the area where the 90/53 guns are deployed. The rear side of the position is shelled as well. Their shelling continues throughout the entire day. The losses among the personnel of the 90/53 guns are especially heavy.

In the afternoon, enemy armored cars and tanks push up to a kilometre south of the Portella. Taken under fire by the 90/53, they retreat towards S. Caterina. Enemy infantry units drive closer to the heights about 1 km south of the Portella.

Day 19

Enemy artillery fire resumes at dawn, heavier than before. Our artillery efficaciously returns fire. Enemy aircraft repeatedly bomb the positions held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment and the area where the artillery is deployed. Four 90/53 guns are hit and disabled.

Enemy infantry elements, having made contact with our advanced units, are forced to retreat. More strong enemy units, armed with automatic weapons, regain contact in the evening with the positions held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment. They are held at the front by the reaction of our weapons, [but] they advance on the flanks of [our] formation. At dusk the enemy, with a surprise action, manages to get a foothold in Portella del Morto.

The 1st Motorized Machine Gun Company, sent on the site, initially contains the enemy but then, overwhelmed by the preponderant enemy forces, is forced to retreat. More enemy units are reported along the valley between the Portella and Resuttano (lower Imera river).

The capture of Villalba by the enemy, the capture of Portella del Morto (which is located behind the positions held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment) by the enemy, the increased activity by strong enemy units that are already operating behind the position and the batteries, the heavy shelling carried out by enemy artillery during the day and the gathering a little to the south of the Portella of considerable motorized forces that make [me] predict a strong enemy attack on the following day, the low efficiency both in morale and material of the 17th Blackshirt Battalion left to defend Alimena, lead me to order the withdrawal of the units deployed at the Portella di Recattivo, in order to group all the available forces in Alimena and directly blockade the road towards Petralia.

Around 21:00 I issue the consequent orders. The withdrawal is carried out during the night under the protection of the 1st Squadron Group, deployed between Portella Recattivo and Resuttano. Strong enemy units hamper the withdrawal and are repelled by the units of the above-mentioned squadron group.

My group, by order of the command of the XII Corps, is subordinated to the command of the "Aosta" Infantry Division.

Day 20

At dawn on day 20 the deployment of the units is the one that can be seen in the attached sketch no. 5.

The roads coming respectively from Villarosa (which the Germans have evacuated) and from Resuttano are blockaded (mines). Agreements made with the Fullriede regimental command, which is passing through Alimena, lead to the allocation to my group of three 76/45 mm anti-tank guns. [These] are sent to the units [and] reinforce their defensive capabilities.

The artillery observatory of the 233rd Group reports considerable movement of [enemy] vehicles along the Villarosa-Villapriolo road. More vehicles are reported on their way from Villarosa towards S. Caterina Villarmosa. These news are confirmed by the patrols sent since the morning towards Villapriolo. At 14:00 our artillery (233rd Group) starts firing on the motor vehicles coming from Villapriolo and heading towards Alimena, forcing them to retreat. Fire resumes shortly thereafter, going on for several hours, against armored cars, tanks and enemy motorized columns that, having gone beyond Villapriolo, are heading towards Alimena. The enemy artillery returns fire. Shells intended for the battery fall on the positions held by the 17th Blackshirt Battalion, which suffers considerable losses (24 killed – 30 wounded).

All quiet in the segment of the frontline held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment; heavy air activity in the whole sector. The "Aosta" divisonal command orders that the 1st Squadron Group "Cavalleggeri di Palermo" send, starting at 2:00 in the following morning, strong patrols along the valley of the Salso river, with the task of ascertaining if the area is clear of enemies. More patrols, at my orders, are sent towards Villapriolo.

Day 21

Around 2:00 strong enemy units, with a surprise action, attack along the segment of the front held by the 17th Blackshirt Battalion. The surprise succeeds. [Enemy] patrols penetrate our deployment and capture Height 1007. The blackshirts retreat without fighting, in disorder. At 2:45 the commander of the 233rd Group (Major Di Mase) reports that due to the collapse of the blackshirt battalion, he was forced to use his own troops and means for the close defens of the towns, managing to prevent their capture. To said officer I order to deploy his guns north of Alimena, near the road, with anti-tank function. An officer from the command is sent to the commander of the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment with orders to counterattack with a company, towards the town of Alimena. Another officer from the command is sent to the 19th "Centauro" Group in order to inform its commander about the situation and to provide for the close defense of the group. The dispersed blackshirts are gathered near my command post, located about 300 meters north of the town, and reorganized.

I order the commander of the 17th Blackshirt Battalion to immediately counterattack and recapture Height 1007. The remnants of the 1st Motorized Machine Gun Company (less a platoon) are deployed near the 233rd Group. Thus, with the following units: the above-mentioned group [233rd], 19th "Centauro" Group, remnants of the 1st Motorized Machine Gun Company, a second position is assembled, which would try to contain the enemy advance. The three anti-tank guns that had been allocated to the command of the German Fullriede regiment hastily retreat towards Bompietro.

The 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, around 07:00, begins with a company the ordered counterattack. Said unit, targeted with heavy artillery fire, bombed by the air force, attacked by strong enemy units, does not desist from its defensive stance. Advanced elements of the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment reach the town. The counterattack is efficaciously supported by fire from the 19th "Centauro" Group whose personnel profuses itself with elan and valor, unconcerned by the losses that enemy counterbattery fire causes among its ranks. The action carries on. The enemy sends more infantry units into the fight.

On our part, all the units are heavily engaged. In the vicinity of the town, the fight goes on with varying fortunes. Attacks and counterattacks follow one another almost uninterruptedly. The enemy, in the face of the strenous dogged resistance of our forces, around 10:30 throws numerous tanks into the fight. These, unable to use the road because [it has been] interrupted, overflow northeast of Alimena. The first tanks, hit by accurate gunfire from our artillery, are stopped. More arrive which, having overcome the barrage, quickly penetrate our formation, arriving behind the 19th "Centauro" group that, although surrounded, defends itself tenaciously.

Simultaneously with the attack of the enemy tanks, the German artillery, deployed south of Bompietro, begins a very heavy fire on the 19th group and on the positions held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment. An officer is sent to the German regimental command so as to inform it about the arrangement of our line and the deployment of our artillery. As the 19th Group has been overrun, the resistance continues in the section of front held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment by isolated units, till about 14:00.

The enemy tanks (about 20), after overcoming our positions, drive along the road towards Bompietro, and arrive close to this town. The accurate fire from several German batteries finally forces them to withdraw.

Together with Major Bertino, Major Cingolani and a few soldiers, I manage to escape the tanks and through the countryside I reach Bompietro.

Area of operations, 4 August 1943

The General Commanding the Tactical Group

                                                                                  (Ottorino Schreiber)

Italian General Ottorino Schreiber, commander of the 207th Coastal Division and then of the "Schreiber" Tactical Group