Report about the events that involved the 207th Coastal Division on 10 July 1943 and the "Schreiber" Tactical Group from 11 July to 21 July 1943

Report about the events that involved the 207th Coastal Division on 10 July 1943 and the "Schreiber" Tactical Group from 11 July to 21 July 1943

4 August 1943 – From the Command of the "Assietta" Infantry Division to the Command of the XII Corps

As ordered by the Command of the XII Corps, on the morning of 9 July all the units of the 207th Coastal Division were put in a state of alert (without involving the population). More messages followed about strenghtening the surveillance and allow the units in better condition to timely face a possible enemy landing attempt; an attempt that the Anglo-American propaganda and the information that had been gathered made [us] presume to be imminent.

At 19:00 the Command of the XII Corps radioed that a convoy of transport ships, heavily escorted, was sailing from the Algerian and Tunisian ports with course north, north-east. Another convoy, composed of about 300 ships between transport ships and landing craft, heavily escorted by warships, was reported near Malta. Immediately afterwards, news was received that said convoy was sailing with part of its ships towards the north-east; the other ships towards the north-west.

At 01:00 on 10 July the Command of the XII Corps ordered to put the state of emergency into effect. The modalities were those previously decided and mentioned in the No. 1 Ordinance of the Armed Forces Command of Sicily (H. E. Roatta). These measures are immediately implemented.

Shortly thereafter the deputy chief of staff of the Armed Forces Command (Colonel Bogliaccino) ordered by telephone to quickly blow up and thus destroy the harbours of Licata and Porto Empedocle. Orders were issued accordingly.

During the night the divisional command was moved to the stronghold of Rupe Atenea (command post – observatory).

At 4:00 the Licata Sector Command reported that said port had been rendered unusable in accordance with the plans for its destruction with explosives. A similar message arrived around 4:30 from the Porto Empedocle Sector Command about making unserviceable the central pier of that harbour.

All of the above was reported to the Command of the XII Corps, which immediately thereafter ordered to start the work for the destruction of the western and eastern piers of the harbour of Porto Empedocle. The commander of the 109th Sapper Company, tasked with carrying out this order, returns to the scene with the necessary personnel and material. At about 10:00 the Porto Empedocle Sector Command reports that the two above-mentioned piers have been destroyed.

News come from the Licata sector command about the approach of numerous enemy landing craft near Licata harbour, Torre di Gaffe and Regione Fontanazza. Transport ships and warships are also reported as sailing towards the port of Licata. As soon as the landing craft come within effective range, the reaction by the artillery units deployed near the coast begins, timely and heavy. Many craft are destroyed. The surviving ones come closer and, supported by their air force and the naval artillery that are incessantly pounding our positions, they manage to reach the beach allowing the landing of troops, vehicles and tanks. Local fighting breaks out and continues for some hours in the areas where the enemy has managed to land. The enemy air force, which has the control of the air, hampers the influx of reinforcements and reserves, that suffer heavy losses as a consequence of the continuous bombing and strafing actions. Enemy motorized and armoured forces invade the Licata plain, heading for the S. Oliva station and towards C. Sillitti Alta. The Licata sector command assembles all the units at its disposal in the area of S. Oliva station and sends them to the counterattack, but is unable to repel the enemy, due to the prevalence of the enemy forces.

Another counterattack could have been carried out by the tactical group commanded by Console [Blackshirt rank equivalent to Colonel] Negroni – composed of the 17th Blackshirt Battalion and the 1st "Cavalleggeri di Palermo" Cavalry Squadron Group [cavalry unit equivalent to battalion] – which since five in the morning had been ordered to move from the Catena and Ravanusa area to the S. Oliva area. But this group, for unknown reasons, never arrived on the scene. It instead appears that, by order of the above-mentioned Console Negroni, at some point the group retreated through Ravanusa and towards Caltanissetta. Both this decision and the chosen path of retreat appear to be very strange; if the withdrawal had been decided, this should have been executed towards Canicattì, where those units, in co-operation with other units, could have taken part in more operations.

Once the coastal units in the Licata sector, overwhelmed by the prevalent enemy forces, had ceaed their resistance, the enemy action gradually moved towards Campobello di Licata, with some smaller units heading towards Palma di Montechiaro (passing through C. Sillitti Alta). A platoon of the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company, sent from Agrigento beyond Palma di Montechiaro, manages – not without difficulty – to occupy a position a little to the east of this town, but shortly afterwards is forced to retreat to the west of the town.

The threat against Campobello di Licata remains serious; in order to face it, the Command of the XII Corps allocates to me, at my request, the 162nd Self-Propelled 90/53 mm Anti-Tank Gun Group, stationed in Canicattì, and the 526th Bersaglieri Battalion, stationed in Aragona. As the above-mentioned gun group immediately starts to move towards the ordered position, I attach to it the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company, except for a platoon, in order to ensure the close defense of the guns.

The above-mentioned group is deployed near Favarotta, blockading the road from Licata. The 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company is deployed in front of the guns, in order to provide defense to them. The 526th Bersaglieri Battalion, carried by motor vehicles, only reaches the above-mentioned area during the night. Colonel Venturi, in command of the 177th Bersaglieri Regiment, takes command of the tactical group (the above-mentioned battalion, the 162nd SPG Group, the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company).

I am subsequently allocated the following units:

–        the 527th Bersaglieri Battalion, stationed in Favara

–        a 105/28 mm artillery group,

–        the 35th Bersaglieri Battalion of the 10th Regiment (motorized),

–        a 75/27 mm battery.

The Command of the XII Corps order the following manoeuvres to be carried out at dawn on day 11:

a) Counterattack from the Favarotta area in the direction of S. Oliva – Licata. Forces allocated: Command of the 177th Bersaglieri Regiment; 526th Bersaglieri Battalion; 162nd 90/53 Group; 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company (minus one platoon).

b) Counterattack from the Naro river in the direction of Palma di Montechiaro. Forces allocated: 35th Battalion of the 10th Bersaglieri Regiment; one 75/27 mm battery.

c) Counterattack from the position currently held west of Palma di Montechiaro in the direction of Palma di Montechiaro – Licata. Forces allocated: 527th Bersaglieri Battalion (from Favara, in the morning of July 10 it has been moved to Masseria Giudice, near Cozzo Mosè); a 105/28 mm battery; a platoon of the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company.

I am allocated another battalion of the 10th Bersaglieri Regiment, which is despatched, with motor vehicles, to the Agrigento area.

Day 11 (morning)

Campobello di Licata Sector

At dawn on day 11 the enemy, with considerable forces and significant numbers of motor vehicles, suddenly attacks in the Favarotta sector. Our reaction is prompt and vigorous. Armored cars and tanks are destroyed by the accurate fire from the 90/53 mm guns. The action goes on for several hours, heavily engaging [our] units. The enemy sends more units into the fight. Attacks and counterattacks follow one another for the occupation of Favarotta.

Some of the 90/53 mm guns are hit by enemy anti-tank fire and are disabled; the 526th Bersaglieri Battalion and the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company suffer heavy losses. During a counterattack, Colonel Venturi, the commander of the group, his wounded. He returns to his command post after hasty treatment.

The disparity in forces and means forces [our] withdrawal. This is carried out under the protection of the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company.

The units concentrate in the S. Silvestro area, about 4 km south of Canicattì. In order to reinforce the new formation, the Corps command allocates [to us] the 162nd Self-Propelled 90/53 Anti-Tank Gun Group.

Naro Sector

The counterattack from Naro towards Palma di Montechiaro, which should have taken place simultaneously with the counterattack towards S. Oliva – Licata from Campobello di Licata, has to be postponed to the afternoon, due to the delayed arrival of the 35th Motorized Bersaglieri Battalion and of its 75/27 mm battery. This battalion only arrives in Spinasanta (Agrigento) around 8:00 on 11 July. Sent towards the Naro river, it stops near Castrofilippo, where the commander arranges his men, material and vehicles in view of the imminent action. [The battalion] resumes its march with security measures around 11:00.

Palma di Montechiaro Sector

The action towards Palma di Montechiaro, aimed at the recapture of the town, is carried out by the 527th Bersaglieri Battalion, which has come from Masserie Giudice, and reinforced by a 105/28 mm battery and by a platoon from the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company. The Bersaglieri battalion and the battery have arrived west of Palma di Montechiaro in the night between 10 and 11 July. In the early hours of the morning, a company of the Bersaglieri battalion manages to recapture Palma di Montechiaro with a surprise action, driving the enemy outside of the town. The arrival of additional enemy forces, which heavily engage the above-mentioned company, lead the battalion commander to engage the other units inside the town and in the surrounding hills. Fierce fighting thus goes on with varying fortunes. In the end, the intervention of enemy tanks and armoured cars hastens the enemy victory. The battalion is surrounded and forced to surrender.

Day 11 (afternoon)

Around 10:35, by order of the Command of the XII Corps, I leave Agrigento in order to go to Canicattì to take command of a tactical group that includes:

–        a tactical group [commanded by] Colonel Venturi;

–        a German regiment (Colonel Geisler),

with the task of counterattacking towards Licata in order to thrown the enemy back into the sea.

I arrive in Canicattì around 11:30. A lot of time is needed to make contact with the German regimental commander. The Geisler regiment is composed of a battalion stationed in the Castrofilippo area as well as minor units.

The attack begins around 13:30; some units of the German regiment get to about two kilometres south of Campobello; but the enemy artillery fire and a counterattack supported by tanks force said units to retreat. Some tanks push west of Canicattì. It becomes clear that the enemy has already reached, on the hills south of Campobello, such a strength (heavy artillery deployment – armoured fighting vehicles) which would render more [counterattack] attempts with few forces and without tanks improductive. I thus decide to concentrate the units on the S. Silvestro position and to give up the counterattack for the moment.

Simultaneously with the action on Campobello, the attack on Naro (35th Bersaglieri Battalion) takes place, leading to the capture of the hills north of the town. The enemy, having arrived into the town, vainly tries to repel our units.

Besides the 105/28 battery which has been positioned since the morning near Serralunga, another 105/28 battery, which has recently arrived, i salso deployed south of Canicattì, its task including serving as an anti-tank battery.

The enemy re-establishes contact [with our units]. Around 18:00 an attack by tanks, followed by infanty, takes place. The attack resumes around 19:00 with greater intensity. Some tanks are about to enter the town; they are however stopped, and part of them destroyed, by some 90/53 mm guns that I had promptly deployed a little to the south-west of Canicattì. The remaining enemy tanks retreat to their starting positions.

Between 18:00 and 19:00 many enemy aircraft carry out a heavy bombing on Canicattì and especially on its train station. Even the enemy artillery fires on the town itself.

The Corps command reports that it has allocated [to us] the following units:ù

–        truck borne group of the "Assietta" Division, including the 3rd Battalion of the 30th Infantry Regiment and the 233rd 75/27 mm T.M. Artillery Group;

–        the 2nd Battalion of the 6th Infantry Regiment – truck borne,

–        the 28th "Aosta" Artillery Company – truck borne,

–        the 19th 105/28 mm "Centauro" Group.

Gathering area: Serradifalco.

With the forces already at my disposal and with those above mentioned, I am to resume the counterattack on the morning of the following day (12 July).

At about 20:00 Colonel Fullriede, commander of a German regiment of the 15th Division which is coming from Canicattì, presents himself and informs me that he has taken command of all German forces in the sector and that he is subordinated to me.

He also tells me that the Armed Forces Command Sicily has given order to take a defensive stance in the Canicattì sector, waiting for the arrival of new German forces with which the Sizilien Division (15h) would launch the counteroffensive.

The command of the XII Corps, which I phoned to receive orders, tells me that Colonel Fullriede’s information is not correct, and confirms that in the following morning (July 12) with all the Italian and German forces already in the area and with those that are soon going to arrive, I must resume the counterattack towards Licata in order to drive the enemy back into the sea.

Colonel Fullriede, to which I relate the orders that I received from the command of the XII Corps, declares that, in consideration of the available forces and the enemy situation, he rules out the possibility of participating in the action [with his forces]. He appears especially worried by the news gathered by the advanced patrols about the movements of strong enemy units west of Canicattì. Following a phone conversation that Colonel Fullriede had with the commander of the 15th German Division, he [Fullriede] tells me that he intends move, during the night, with his regiment just north of Canicattì in order to avoid the feared enemy outflanking manoeuvre on the right (west). He moreover informs me that this measure has been approved by the Armed Forces Command Sicily. He insists about the necessity not to lose time, due to the seriousness of the situation, that does not allow for any other solution. Colonel Fullriede himself then immediately proceeds to issue the orders for the withdrawal on the rearward line of the German troops.

In the meantime, the command of the XII Corps, altering what had been previously ordered, orders me to limit my activity to partial counterattack actions as long as these do not entail a waste of men and means but are justified by the necessity to mantain the positions. Basically, our stance is radically modified.

I order that the few Italian units deployed south of Canicattì also retreat towards the new positions located north of the town. The withdrawal is carried out not without difficulty. The 105/28 battery stationed in Serralunga (road to Naro), overpowere by the enemy, falls in enemy hands after disabling its guns.

Additionally, I order the 35th Bersaglieri Battalion, which would remain completely isolated in the Naro area, to retreat to Castrofilippo during the night.

Day 12

Following the movements that took place during the night, the troops under my command have assumed the deployment that can be seen in the no. 1 attached sketch. 

I want to learn whether the new units allocated to me and headed for Serradifalco have reached said town or not. An officer from my command is sent to Serradifalco. The 3rd Battalion of the 30th Infantry Regiment arrives in Serradifalco around 7:00. The personnel is gathered south of the town, in a sheltered area, waiting for orders for their subsequent employment. The motor vehicles are sent beyond the town along the road to San Cataldo, in order for them to avoid the enemy air action.

Lieutenant Colonel Spinelli, in command of the 3rd Battalion of the 30th Infantry Regiment, relates to me that, during the movement:

–        thirty Spa L 39 trucks have been set afire and destroyed by enemy air strikes; part of the material (weapons and ammunition) has been recovered;

–        the Sicilian soldiers have arbitrarily left (20 % of the total force);

–        the losses are limited to ten men slightly wounded.

Subsequently, the 233rd 75/27 mm T.M. Artillery Group arrives – It gathers near the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment. Later still, the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment and the commander of the 19th 105/28 "Centauro" Group arrive. Their respective units are stopped along the road that from Montedoro leads to Serradifalco. They inform me that during the movement, that due to contingent reasons was largely carried out during daytime, their units have been repeatedly attacked by waves of Anglo-American bombers, have therefore dispersed and part of the material has been destroyed. More specifically:

–        the 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment "Aosta" is down to 7 officers, 100 men between NCOs and soldiers – 3 submachine guns – 1 machine gun;

–        the 28th Gun Company "Aosta" is down to 3 officers – 54 between NCOs and soldiers – three 47/32 guns;

–        the 233rd 75/27 mm T.M. Group is down to six guns;

–        the 19th "Centauro" Group is down to four 105/28 guns and their tractors.

Motorcycle troops are sent along the path followed by the individual motorized columns in order to direct the stragglers towards Serradifalco. These are basically units with severely reduced efficency and doubtful operational capacities.

While we proceed to reorganize these units, the German regimental command informs that the enemy has attacked in force in the sector of the frontline held by the 1st and 2nd Battalions. The German troops are heavily engaged. The two 90/53 SPG groups, used in anti-tank function, also participate in the action, as well as a 105/28 battery. The battle resumes in the afternoon, fiercer than before. Despite the considerable losses suffered by the German units, the attack is contained.

The remnants of the 526th Bersaglieri Battalion also participate in the fighting.

At about 19:00 another attack in force causes the collapse of the 2nd German Battalion. This entails the withdrawal of the entire formation towards the Serradifalco – S. Cataldo position. The 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, reinforced by the 233rd Group, takes position south of Serradifalco, covering the withdrawal. The above-mentioned battalion is allocated a formation company, formed with all the available elements (about a hundred men) of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment. The final deployment assumed during the night by all troops under my command can be seen in the no. 2 attached sketch.

The command of the XII Corps allocates [to me] a radio station in order to mantain a connection, and a patrol of Carabinieri motorcyclists with the task of relaying any urgent operative news.

Day 13

I ask by radio the command of the XII Corps what is the situation on my right, and I am answered that Racalmuto is heavily garrisoned by our troops, which also included armored car units. German armored cars, sent on patrol to Montedoro and Racalmuto in order to make contact with the Italian troops, instead report that in Racalmuto there are only four Carabinieri.

At 10:00 the enemy, using patrols, regains contact with our new deployment. Local clashes arise in the sector held by the German battalions. In the afternoon enemy patrol activity intensifies, and is followed by an attack in force towards Serradifalco. After changing fortunes, the American withdraw to their starting positions. Italian artillery participated in this action with interdiction and counterbattery fire. 

The company of the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment previously deployed at the Sommatino crossroads comes back. This unit has suffered considerable losses as a result of aerial bombing and enemy attacks. Of the 75/27 mm section attached to said company, only one gun comes back (the other one has been destroyed by aerial bombing).

Day 14

During the night between July 13 and 14 the Fullriede regiment is reinforced by another two battalions (total five battalions) – two 150 mm guns – three bomb launchers with four 210 mm pieces – about fifteen tanks. The availability of larger forces allows to extend the front to the left as far as Caltanissetta, and to move the resistance line more to the south. The consequent movements are carried out in the night between 14 and 15 July. During the entire day, lively patrol actions between the opposed forces, as well as artillery action. Italian and German patrols are supported by tanks.

Day 15

From the no. 3 attached sketch it is possible to comprehend the new deployment that was assumed during the night.

Movements of armored cars and motor vehicles from Canicattì and from Delia towards our positions are reported. The artillery intervenes with interdiction fire.

The deployment of the units on the positions is completed, and strengthening work is carried out.

Day 16

Motor vehicles are reported on the move from Canicattì and from Delia. Local clashes take place on the frontline. The [enemy] air force bombs our positions. The situation, while basically stationary in our sector, deteriorates instead in Barrafranca and Pietraperzia where units subordinated to the 15th Division "Sizilien" (Ens Regiment), after bitter fighting and dogged resistance, are forced to withdraw in the face of the prevalent enemy attacking forces.

The retreat of those units, along with other events, induce the Armed Forces Command Sicily to order the retreat of the tactical group under my command.

The Fullriede Group, by orders from the command of the 15th Division "Sizilien", must go to Leonforte. Beginning of the movement: the night between July 16 and 17.

The Italian troops, by orders from the Command of the XII Corps, must reach the Portella Recattivo-Alimeno area and blockade the roads coming from S. Caterina di Villarmosa and from Villacapriolo. Beginning of the movement: the evening of July 17.

I order that the command of the 17th Blackshirt Legion, the 17th Blackshirt Battalion and the 1st Squadron Group "Cavalleggeri di Palermo" which, to my surprise, I found idle in Caltanissetta, are to be incorporated into my tactical group.

Orders are given to the people responsible for the clothing and army provisions depots, located near the S. Cataldo railway station, for the distribution of food and clothing to the population. The distribution, supervised by the S. Cataldo Carabinieri, begins on the same evening and continues during the night.

At 22:00 the movement begins.

The following units are sent towards Alimena:

–        Command of the 17th Blackshirt Legion;

–        17th Blackshirt Battalion;

–        28th Artillery Company "Aosta";

–        233rd 75/27 T.M. Artillery Group;

–        two 90/53 mm guns.

The following units are sent towards Portella Recattivo:

–        3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment (truck borne),

–        formation company of the 2nd Battalion, 6th Infantry Regiment (truck borne),

–        19th 105/28 mm Group "Centauro",

–        1st Squadron Group "Cavalleggeri di Palermo",

–        1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company,

–        four 90/53 mm guns.

Colonel Perrone, in command of Mobile Group "A", presents himself and reports that he has reached, with the motorized armored group at his orders, the Villalba station.

Day 17

In the night between July 16 and 17 the movement towards the Alimena and Portella Recattivo positions generally carries on by the book.

The 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, having reached the crossroads to S. Caterina Villarmosa, is forced to follow another path as the road towards S. Caterina Villarmosa had been interrupted in multiple points by German sappers. This unforeseen difficulty forces the battalion to stop at dawn in the Resuttano area, then resuming the movement late in the evening.

The defense of the Portella [a small mountain pass] is initially entrusted to the 1st Motorized Machine-Gun Company, to the 90/53 mm guns and to the 19th "Centauro" Group. On the spot, verbal orders are given for the organization of the defense of Portella Recattivo (Lieutenant Colonel Spinelli) and Alimena (Console Negroni).

I later go to the Villalba station in order to make contact with Mobile Group "A" (Lieutenant Colonel Perrone). There I find that the above-mentioned group is gathered in a wood and that no measures have been taken for reconnaissance and security. I therefore order that the two roads leading to the town of Villalba are blockaded, and that patrols are sent south of said town.

Day 18

In the night between 17 and 18 July the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiments reaches the Portella Recattivo. The deployment of the units can be seen in the no. 4 attachment. 

On the same night, the 1st Squadron Group "Cavalleggeri di Palermo" and the 1st Motorized Machine Gun Company are transferred by me to Resuttano.

During the entire day, patrols sent by me south of Portella Recattivo report considerable movement of armored vehicles in the S. Caterina Villarmosa area, coming from Caltanissetta and heading towards Vallelunga. More motor vehicles are reported in movement towards Portella Recattivo. Our artillery intervenes. The vehicles heading towards the Portella fall back. At 7:00 the enemy artillery opens a heavy and accurate fire on our positions held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment and on the area where the 90/53 guns are deployed. The rear side of the position is shelled as well. Their shelling continues throughout the entire day. The losses among the personnel of the 90/53 guns are especially heavy.

In the afternoon, enemy armored cars and tanks push up to a kilometre south of the Portella. Taken under fire by the 90/53, they retreat towards S. Caterina. Enemy infantry units drive closer to the heights about 1 km south of the Portella.

Day 19

Enemy artillery fire resumes at dawn, heavier than before. Our artillery efficaciously returns fire. Enemy aircraft repeatedly bomb the positions held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment and the area where the artillery is deployed. Four 90/53 guns are hit and disabled.

Enemy infantry elements, having made contact with our advanced units, are forced to retreat. More strong enemy units, armed with automatic weapons, regain contact in the evening with the positions held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment. They are held at the front by the reaction of our weapons, [but] they advance on the flanks of [our] formation. At dusk the enemy, with a surprise action, manages to get a foothold in Portella del Morto.

The 1st Motorized Machine Gun Company, sent on the site, initially contains the enemy but then, overwhelmed by the preponderant enemy forces, is forced to retreat. More enemy units are reported along the valley between the Portella and Resuttano (lower Imera river).

The capture of Villalba by the enemy, the capture of Portella del Morto (which is located behind the positions held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment) by the enemy, the increased activity by strong enemy units that are already operating behind the position and the batteries, the heavy shelling carried out by enemy artillery during the day and the gathering a little to the south of the Portella of considerable motorized forces that make [me] predict a strong enemy attack on the following day, the low efficiency both in morale and material of the 17th Blackshirt Battalion left to defend Alimena, lead me to order the withdrawal of the units deployed at the Portella di Recattivo, in order to group all the available forces in Alimena and directly blockade the road towards Petralia.

Around 21:00 I issue the consequent orders. The withdrawal is carried out during the night under the protection of the 1st Squadron Group, deployed between Portella Recattivo and Resuttano. Strong enemy units hamper the withdrawal and are repelled by the units of the above-mentioned squadron group.

My group, by order of the command of the XII Corps, is subordinated to the command of the "Aosta" Infantry Division.

Day 20

At dawn on day 20 the deployment of the units is the one that can be seen in the attached sketch no. 5.

The roads coming respectively from Villarosa (which the Germans have evacuated) and from Resuttano are blockaded (mines). Agreements made with the Fullriede regimental command, which is passing through Alimena, lead to the allocation to my group of three 76/45 mm anti-tank guns. [These] are sent to the units [and] reinforce their defensive capabilities.

The artillery observatory of the 233rd Group reports considerable movement of [enemy] vehicles along the Villarosa-Villapriolo road. More vehicles are reported on their way from Villarosa towards S. Caterina Villarmosa. These news are confirmed by the patrols sent since the morning towards Villapriolo. At 14:00 our artillery (233rd Group) starts firing on the motor vehicles coming from Villapriolo and heading towards Alimena, forcing them to retreat. Fire resumes shortly thereafter, going on for several hours, against armored cars, tanks and enemy motorized columns that, having gone beyond Villapriolo, are heading towards Alimena. The enemy artillery returns fire. Shells intended for the battery fall on the positions held by the 17th Blackshirt Battalion, which suffers considerable losses (24 killed – 30 wounded).

All quiet in the segment of the frontline held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment; heavy air activity in the whole sector. The "Aosta" divisonal command orders that the 1st Squadron Group "Cavalleggeri di Palermo" send, starting at 2:00 in the following morning, strong patrols along the valley of the Salso river, with the task of ascertaining if the area is clear of enemies. More patrols, at my orders, are sent towards Villapriolo.

Day 21

Around 2:00 strong enemy units, with a surprise action, attack along the segment of the front held by the 17th Blackshirt Battalion. The surprise succeeds. [Enemy] patrols penetrate our deployment and capture Height 1007. The blackshirts retreat without fighting, in disorder. At 2:45 the commander of the 233rd Group (Major Di Mase) reports that due to the collapse of the blackshirt battalion, he was forced to use his own troops and means for the close defens of the towns, managing to prevent their capture. To said officer I order to deploy his guns north of Alimena, near the road, with anti-tank function. An officer from the command is sent to the commander of the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment with orders to counterattack with a company, towards the town of Alimena. Another officer from the command is sent to the 19th "Centauro" Group in order to inform its commander about the situation and to provide for the close defense of the group. The dispersed blackshirts are gathered near my command post, located about 300 meters north of the town, and reorganized.

I order the commander of the 17th Blackshirt Battalion to immediately counterattack and recapture Height 1007. The remnants of the 1st Motorized Machine Gun Company (less a platoon) are deployed near the 233rd Group. Thus, with the following units: the above-mentioned group [233rd], 19th "Centauro" Group, remnants of the 1st Motorized Machine Gun Company, a second position is assembled, which would try to contain the enemy advance. The three anti-tank guns that had been allocated to the command of the German Fullriede regiment hastily retreat towards Bompietro.

The 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment, around 07:00, begins with a company the ordered counterattack. Said unit, targeted with heavy artillery fire, bombed by the air force, attacked by strong enemy units, does not desist from its defensive stance. Advanced elements of the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment reach the town. The counterattack is efficaciously supported by fire from the 19th "Centauro" Group whose personnel profuses itself with elan and valor, unconcerned by the losses that enemy counterbattery fire causes among its ranks. The action carries on. The enemy sends more infantry units into the fight.

On our part, all the units are heavily engaged. In the vicinity of the town, the fight goes on with varying fortunes. Attacks and counterattacks follow one another almost uninterruptedly. The enemy, in the face of the strenous dogged resistance of our forces, around 10:30 throws numerous tanks into the fight. These, unable to use the road because [it has been] interrupted, overflow northeast of Alimena. The first tanks, hit by accurate gunfire from our artillery, are stopped. More arrive which, having overcome the barrage, quickly penetrate our formation, arriving behind the 19th "Centauro" group that, although surrounded, defends itself tenaciously.

Simultaneously with the attack of the enemy tanks, the German artillery, deployed south of Bompietro, begins a very heavy fire on the 19th group and on the positions held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment. An officer is sent to the German regimental command so as to inform it about the arrangement of our line and the deployment of our artillery. As the 19th Group has been overrun, the resistance continues in the section of front held by the 3rd Battalion, 30th Infantry Regiment by isolated units, till about 14:00.

The enemy tanks (about 20), after overcoming our positions, drive along the road towards Bompietro, and arrive close to this town. The accurate fire from several German batteries finally forces them to withdraw.

Together with Major Bertino, Major Cingolani and a few soldiers, I manage to escape the tanks and through the countryside I reach Bompietro.

Area of operations, 4 August 1943

The General Commanding the Tactical Group

                                                                                  (Ottorino Schreiber)

Italian General Ottorino Schreiber, commander of the 207th Coastal Division and then of the "Schreiber" Tactical Group