After the fall of Noto,
the remnants of the 146th Coastal Regiment, about 600 men led by Colonel Felice
Bartimmo Cancellara, started their tormented retreat towards Vizzini.
The retreating column was
composed of the command and a company of the 437th Battalion, the 224th 100/22
mm Artillery Group, the 233rd Self-Propelled Artillery Group and some Engineer
units. During the night the column stopped near Villa Messina, whereas the
commander of the 224th Group, Major Mambrini, with some officers from his
command, carried on the march towards Vizzini. At the Mulino (Mill) crossroads,
km 13, the group was fired on by machine guns and Major Mambrini was mortally
wounded.
Before dawn, Cancellara
decided to withdraw towards Palazzolo, which he found destroyed by the air
raids and abandoned by the population. The diary of the 146th Coastal Infantry
Regiment states that at 6:30 on 11 July the column entered Palazzolo. According
to Cancellara, “it was not possible to mantain the position in Palazzolo,
already outflanked on the Canicattini/Giarratana side”, but he was wrong – Giarratana
was still in Italian hands, and General Giulio Cesare Gotti Porcinari,
commander of the 54th Infantry Division "Napoli", was sending an
infantry battalion and an artillery group to garrison the important Palazzolo
crossroads, with orders to resist. General Fiumara (deputy commander of the "Napoli"
Division), in command of the Palazzolo position, wrote in his report:
“Everybody confirmed that coastal garrisons and troops would withdraw towards
Palazzolo. But nobody appeared and thus was disappointed our hope to reinforce
our formation”.
Apparently, neither
Fiumara nor Cancellara were aware of each other’s presence: Fiumara was not
informed of the presence of Cancellara’s column, and Cancellara did not look
for the sector commander. On that morning, Fiumara went to the frontline in
Solarino, reaching his superior Gotti Porcinari, who was inspecting the
defences. Cancellara, unable to find the command of the 75th Infantry Regiment
(that had moved to Solarino), proceeded with his unit towards Vizzini, where he
deployed his men on a line facing Bucchieri. Before dark, stragglers from
Ragusa and Modica started to arrive in Vizzini; a non-commissioned officer from
the command of the 206th Division, coming from Modica, told Cancellara that the
town had already fallen (in reality, Modica was still in Italian hands, whereas
Ragusa had really been taken by American troops). In Vizzini, Cancellara went
to the command of the "Napoli" Division, where he found only the
liaison officer, Captain Avetta, as the tactical command had moved closer to
the frontline near Solarino, and the administrative command had been ordered to
withdraw to Caltagirone. Therefore, during the night, Cancellara led his unit
to Caltagirone, in the hope of reorganizing his men. In the following morning
he went alone to Piazza Amerina, where the command of the XVI Corps was
located, and he reported the situation. General Carlo Rossi, commander of the
XVI Corps, ordered Cancellara to join with his unit the recruit battalion in
Monterosso Almo, and to place himself at disposal of the commander of the "Napoli"
Division. The artillerymen and engineers were attached to the Corps artillery
and engineer units, whereas the 233rd Self-Propelled Gun Group was attached to
the 131st Tank Regiment. On the same day – July 12 – the command of the XVI
Corps left Piazza Armerina and moved to Biancavilla.
The retreat of
Cancellara’s column was described by Second Lieutenant Litterio Villari,
commander of the command platoon of the 233rd Self-Propelled Gun Group, in his diary:
“At dawn we pass through Palazzolo
Acreide, half destroyed by the bombing raids, heading for Vizzini. (…) While on the road, in the plain near
Buccheri, [the platoon] was subjected
to bombing and strafing attacks by Anglo-American Lockheed aircraft. These
terrible aircraft, always over our heads, never opposed by out nonexistant air
force, usually called by us two-tailed aircraft [evidently, Lockheed P-38
“Lightnings”], inflicted much damage on
our vehicles. As we spotted them in time, I was able to order my tankers to
jump off the vehicles and seek shelter below the bridges. I sought shelter
behind a highway location marker, so that I could observe the aircraft and be
thus able to give the order to resume the march, once they had gone away. In
this situation, I was able to ascertain that the bullets from the enemy
aircraft’s machine guns, on hitting the road’s asphalt, created many flashy
sparks. My own vehicle was hit multiple times, but luckily wheels and engine
remained untouched. My suitcase, containing my personal items, was instead hit
by a bullet which caused a small entry hole and a large exit hole. It scored a
direct hit on my alarm clock, which I found in little pieces. In Vizzini, where
we arrived at 12:00 on July 11, we took shelter below the trees (poplars) in a
long rural boulevard not far from the railway station. We were readying for the
evening when orders came to move to Caltagirone. My platoon was the first to
move. [I] started the transfer around
16:00 and arrived unharmed in Caltagirone at 18:00. The units that were
following me were instead bombed and strafed. The battalion workshop,
supervised by Second Lieutenant Ernesto Cocco (from Chieti), my companion from
the Academy, was hit hard. Cocco survived but was stunned (he showed signs of
mental imbalance); among his subordinates several were killed or wounded. The
trucks with fuel and ammunition blew up”.
(Main source: Domenico Anfora, "La battaglia degli Iblei")
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